Collapse theories are versions of quantum mechanics according to which the collapse of the wave function is a real physical process. They propose precise mathematical laws to govern this process and to replace the vague conventional prescription that a collapse occurs whenever an "observer" makes a "measurement." Although collapse theories have been invented to overcome the paradoxes of orthodox quantum mechanics, several authors have set up similar paradoxes in collapse theories. I argue here that these paradoxes evaporate as soon as a clear choice of the primitive ontology (i.e., of the variables in the theory representing the distribution of matter in space and time) is introduced, such as the flash ontology or the matter density ontology. PACS: 03.65.Ta. Key words: quantum theory without observers; Ghirardi-RiminiWeber (GRW) theory of spontaneous wave function collapse; primitive ontology; quantum measurement problem.
Introduction
According to collapse theories of quantum mechanics, such as the Ghirardi-RiminiWeber (GRW) theory [14, 8] or similar ones [7] , the time evolution of the wave function ψ in our world is not unitary but instead stochastic and non-linear; the Schrödinger equation is merely an approximation, valid for systems of few particles but not for macroscopic systems, i.e., systems with (say) 10 23 or more particles. The time evolution law for ψ provided by the GRW theory is formulated mathematically (see, e.g., [8, 7, 3] ) and can be summarized by saying that the wave function ψ of all the N particles in the universe evolves as if somebody outside the universe made, at random times with rate Nλ, an unsharp "quantum measurement" of the "position observable" of a randomly chosen particle. "Rate Nλ" means that the probability of an event in the next dt seconds is equal to Nλ dt; λ is a constant of order 10 −15 sec −1 .
Collapse theories have been understood in two very different ways: some authors (e.g., [8, 10, 15, 21, 3] ) think that a complete specification of a collapse theory requires, besides the evolution law for ψ, a specification of variables describing the distribution of matter in space and time (called the primitive ontology or PO), while other authors (e.g., [1, 16, 25, 24, 23] ) think that the ontology in a collapse theory consists exclusively of the wave function ψ, and that anything like the PO (i.e., any ontology in 3-space) is unnecessary.
The ultimate goal of this paper is to illustrate the concept of PO and to convey something about its meaning and relevance. Most researchers, physicists as well as philosophers, find it hard to think in terms of a PO, partly because we all have practiced for many years to think "in the quantum mechanical way." As illustrative examples I will use some paradoxes that have been raised as objections to the GRW theory; I will describe what these paradoxes look like from the point of view of a theory with PO, and will point out some advantages of the PO view by showing that it resolves these paradoxes. An introduction to the concept of PO has been given in [3] . I will refer to two particular choices of PO for the GRW theory, the flash ontology and the matter density ontology.
According to the flash ontology [8] , matter is fundamentally described by a discrete set of space-time points called flashes. For comparison, the primitive ontology in classical mechanics is the particle ontology, according to which matter is fundamentally described by a number of curves in space-time called world lines. In the GRW theory with the flash ontology (GRWf for short), there is one flash for each collapse of ψ; its time is the time of the collapse, and its position is the collapse center; see, e.g., [8, 3] for mathematical descriptions.
According to the matter density ontology [10, 15] , matter is fundamentally continuously distributed and described by a density function m(x, y, z, t) on space-time. In the GRW theory with the matter density ontology (GRWm for short), the m function at time t is obtained from |ψ t | 2 (which is a density function on 3N-dimensional configuration space) by integrating out the coordinates of N − 1 particles to get a 3-dimensional density function; in order not to prefer any particle, one averages over all sets of N − 1 particles (perhaps using a weighted average with the particles' masses as weights). See, e.g., [3] for a mathematical description.
The view with which I will contrast GRWf and GRWm is that there is no ontology in 3-space, and that the ontology comprises only ψ; I will abbreviate this view as GRW0. I will argue that the paradoxes we consider evaporate in GRWf and GRWm but pose problems for GRW0.
of two macroscopically distinct states ψ i with ψ 1 = 1 = ψ 2 , such that both contributions have nonzero coefficients c i . Given that there is a problem-the measurement problem-in the case in which the coefficients are equal, one should also think that there is a problem in the case in which the coefficients are not exactly equal, but roughly of the same size. One might say that the reason why there is a problem is that, according to quantum mechanics, there is a superposition whereas according to our intuition there should be a definite state. But then it is hard to see how this problem should go away just because c 2 is much smaller than c 1 . How small would c 2 have to be for the problem to disappear? No matter if c 2 = c 1 or c 2 = c 1 /100 or c 2 = 10 −100 c 1 , in each case both contributions are there. But the only relevant effect of the GRW process replacing the unitary evolution, as far as Schrödinger's cat is concerned, is to randomly make one of the coefficients much smaller than the other.
Answer: The argument is correct about GRW0 and illustrates a difficulty with GRW0. From the point of view of GRWm or GRWf, however, the argument is flawed as it pays no attention to the PO. To take the PO seriously means that whether Schrödinger's cat is really dead must be read off from the PO.
In GRWm, if ψ is close to |dead then m equals m |dead up to a small perturbation, and that should reasonably be accepted as the PO of a dead cat. Yes, the wave function is still a superposition, but the definite facts that our intuition wants can be found in the PO: the m function is always definite and not in a superposition. The m function represents the 3-dimensional reality; the cat is in m, not in ψ. To be sure, we have no precise definition of which m functions should be regarded as dead cats; that fact, however, is not worrisome; it arises simply because the words "dead cat" are not precisely defined in ordinary language.
In GRWf, the fact that the flashes form the shape of a dead cat is not compromised by the existence of a few extra flashes, so the existence of the small contribution c 2 ψ 2 in ψ leads to no obstacle against saying that the cat is dead.
Paradox 2: How Can You Call a Cat Dead if
There is a Small Probability of Finding it Alive?
Paradox: As a variant of the first paradox, one might say that even after the GRW collapses have pushed |c 1 | 2 near 1 and |c 2 | 2 near 0 in the state vector (1), there is still a positive probability |c 2 | 2 that if we make a "quantum measurement" of the macro-stateof whether the cat is dead or alive-we will find the state ψ 2 , even though the GRW state vector has collapsed to a state vector near ψ 1 , a fact that many collapse theorists (e.g., [1, 11] ) would take to mean that the cat is really dead (assuming ψ 1 = |dead ). Thus, it seems not justified to say that, when ψ is close to |dead , the cat is really dead. This paradox is known as "the tail problem" [25, 1, 16, 2] .
Answer: It is important here to appreciate the following difference between orthodox quantum mechanics and GRWm/GRWf concerning the meaning of the wave function and how the wave function makes contact with our world: In orthodox quantum mechanics, a system's wave function governs the probabilities for the outcomes of experiments on the system, whereas in GRWm/GRWf, the wave function governs the PO. This difference creates a difference concerning what one means when saying that the cat is dead: In orthodox quantum mechanics, one means that if we made a "quantum measurement" of the cat's macro-state, we would with probability 1 find it dead, whereas in GRWm/GRWf one means that the PO forms a dead cat. If the cat is dead in this sense, in GRWm/GRWf, and ψ is close but not exactly equal to |dead , then there is still a tiny but non-zero probability that within the next millisecond the collapses occur in such a way that the cat is suddenly alive! But that does not contradict the claim that a millisecond before the cat was dead; it only means that GRWm/GRWf allows strange events (like resurrections) to occur-with tiny probability! In particular, if we observe the cat after that millisecond, there is a positive probability that we find it alive (simply because it is alive) even though before the millisecond it actually was dead. 1 
Paradox 3: Consider Many Systems
Paradox: A variant of the previous paradox was formulated by Lewis [17] in terms of counting marbles; the discussion continued in [11, 12, 4, 5, 6, 13, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23] . Let ψ 1 be the state "the marble is inside the box" and ψ 2 the state "the marble is outside the box"; these wave functions have disjoint supports S 1 , S 2 in configuration space (i.e., wherever one is nonzero the other is zero). Let ψ be given by (1) with 0 < |c 2 | 2 ≪ |c 1 | 2 < 1; finally, consider a system of n (non-interacting) marbles at time t 0 , each with wave function ψ, so that the wave function of the system is ψ ⊗n . Then, for each of the marbles we would feel entitled to say that it is inside the box, but on the other hand, the probability that all marbles be found inside the box is |c 1 | 2n , which can be made arbitrarily small by making n sufficiently large.
Answer: For GRWm it follows from the PO, as in the answer to the previous paradox, that each of the marbles is inside the box at the initial time t 0 . However, it is known that a superposition like (1) of macroscopically distinct states ψ i will approach under the GRW evolution either a wave function ψ 1 (∞) concentrated in S 1 or another ψ 2 (∞) in S 2 with probabilities |c 1 | 2 and |c 2 | 2 , respectively. (Here I am assuming H = 0 for simplicity. Although both coefficients will still be nonzero after any finite number of collapses, one of them will tend to zero in the limit t → ∞.) Thus, for large n the wave function will approach one consisting of approximately n|c 1 | 2 factors ψ 1 (∞) and n|c 2 | 2 factors ψ 2 (∞), so that ultimately about n|c 1 | 2 of the marbles will be inside and about n|c 2 | 2 outside the box-independently of whether anybody observes them or not.
The occurrence of some factors ψ 2 (∞) at a later time provides another example of the resurrection-type events mentioned above; they are unlikely but do occur, of course, if we make n large enough. The act of observation plays no role in the argument and can be taken to merely record pre-existing macroscopic facts. To be sure, the physical interaction involved in the act of observation may have an effect on the system, such as speeding up the evolution from ψ towards either ψ 1 (∞) or ψ 2 (∞); but GRWm provides unambiguous facts about the marbles also in the absence of observers.
In GRWf, the story is a little more involved. The fact that the answer depends on the choice of PO illustrates again the relevance of the PO, as well as the necessity to make the PO and its laws explicit. The story is more involved because the PO cannot be considered at only one point in time t 0 but needs to be considered over some time interval (say a millisecond), and because it depends on randomness. First, if we assume that the smallness of c 2 is due to previous collapses centered inside the box, then the flashes during the millisecond before t 0 form n marbles inside the box. Thus, as in GRWm, initially we have n marbles inside the box, of which n|c 2 | 2 will be outside the box after a while. Now consider the other case: that the smallness of c 2 is not due to previous collapses, but due to some other method of preparing ψ. Then we may have to consider only flashes after t 0 . Consider first a single marble. Something improbable may already happen at this stage; for example, all the flashes might occur outside the box. In that case we would say that the marble is outside the box. As well, it might happen that half of the flashes occur outside and half of them inside the box; in that case we would say that half of the marble's matter is located inside the box. The overwhelmingly probable case, of course, is that more than 99% of the marble's flashes occur inside the box, a case in which it is reasonable to say that the marble is inside the box. Thus, if |c 2 | 2 ≪ |c 1 | 2 at time t 0 then in GRWf (unlike in GRWm) the marble is not necessarily (only very probably) inside the box, provided the time interval we consider is the millisecond after t 0 . Now consider n marbles, with n so big that |c 1 | 2n ≪ 1; then it is not probable any more that for all marbles 99% of the flashes occur inside the box. Rather, the overwhelmingly probable case is that for the majority of marbles 99% of the flashes occur inside the box (so that one should say these marbles are inside), while for a few marbles a significant fraction of flashes occurs outside, and for extremely few marbles even all flashes occur outside. In the limit t → ∞, as a consequence of the convergence to either ψ 1 (∞) or ψ 2 (∞), for each marble either almost all flashes occur inside the box or almost all flashes occur outside.
What is Real and What is Accessible
A final remark concerns Bassi and Ghirardi's reply [4, 5, 6] , [7, Sec. 11 ] to the tail problem and the marble problem. They use GRWm but immediately focus on (what they call) the accessibility of the matter density, i.e., on the fact that the matter density cannot be measured by inhabitants of the GRWm world to arbitrary accuracy. In particular, they point out that for the marble wave function the matter density outside the box is not detectable. I think that Bassi and Ghirardi took two steps at once, thereby making the argument harder to understand for their readers, and that perhaps they do not take the PO seriously enough. To the extent that the worry expressed in the above paradoxes (and by the authors of [25, 1, 17, 11] ) is whether GRW theories do give rise to unambiguous facts about the aliveness of Schrödinger's cat or the location of the marble, it concerns whether GRW theories provide a picture of reality that conforms with our everyday intuition. Such a worry cannot be answered by pointing out what an observer can or cannot measure. Instead, I think, the answer can only lie in what the ontology is like, not in what observers see of it. Moreover, I think, it can only lie in what the primitive ontology is like, as that is the part of the ontology representing "the cat" and "the marble."
Now for the marble state considered above, it is a fact for the matter density ontology that the fraction |c 2 | 2 ≪ 1 of the marble's matter lies outside the box-a fact that does not contradict the claim that the marble is inside the box, as can be illustrated by noting that anyway, for thermodynamic reasons, the marble creates a vapor out of some of its atoms (with low partial pressure), an effect typically outweighing |c 2 | 2 . The state of the PO in which the overwhelming majority of matter is inside the box justifies saying that the marble is inside the box. Thus, the PO does provide a picture of reality that conforms with our everyday intuition. All this is independent of whether the PO is observable (accessible) or not. Bassi and Ghirardi sometimes sound as if they did not to take the matter density seriously when it is not accessible; I submit that the PO should always be taken seriously.
The reason why Bassi and Ghirardi attribute such importance to whether the matter density is accessible is presumably the following: If the matter density outside the box could be measured to be nonzero then this would seem to threaten the claim that the marble is inside. But the threat is actually not serious: For example, the vapor created by the marble can in fact be measured to have nonzero density, but this fact does not at all suggest that "the marble" should be regarded as being outside, it only suggests (indeed, it entails) that a small part of the marble's matter is outside the box.
